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II. STATEMENT E 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order reconsidering an order dismissing a misdemeanor case 
under I.C.R. 48 in the interests of justice and from a subsequent motion to dismiss. Appellant 
Ryan Small asks this Court to reinstate the magistrate comt's order of dismissal. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
Mr. Small was charged by citation with a single count of driving without privileges. 
("DWP") CR 7. A written not guilty plea was entered. CR 9. Later, an Amended Complaint 
charging a Second Offense DWP was filed. CR 23. 
Mr. Small filed a motion to suppress evidence and a hearing was set for March 9, 2010, at 
4:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge Daniel L. Steckel. CR , 27. The minute notes indicate that 
Mr. Small's counsel appeared at 4:00 p.m. on that date and requested that the matter be reset, 
without objection by the state. The matter was reset to May 7, 2010. CR 34-35. 
On March 24, 2010, a Second Amended Complaint was filed charging a Third Offense 
DWP. CR37. 
On the day of the reset motion to suppress hearing, the a1Testing officer was not present. 
Mr. Small moved to dismiss the case noting that the defense was prepared to move forward on 
the case. Counsel noted that Mr. Small is a self-employed contractor and that he missed a day of 
work in order to be present in court. [n addition, since he is also the work crew supervisor, his 
crew members also missed a day of work. T p. ln. 11 - p. 6, In. 8. The state admitted that the 
officer had been subpoenaed and it did not know why he was not present. But the state argued 
that it would "be unfair to dismiss a case when the defense has already gotten a continuance:' T 
p. 7, In. 20-21. Mr. Small then told the Court that he and his attorney were present on March 9, 
but that his name did not appear on the docket sheet. T p. 9, In. 5-9. Mr. Small's counsel 
confirmed that they arrived at 4:00 p.m., but did not see Mr. Small's case listed on the docket 
sheet. Further, the fact that the hearing was continued on that day should not be held against Mr. 
Small since the motion could not have been conducted in the hour left in the court day in any 
case. T p. 9, In. 10-16. 
The motion to dismiss was granted. T p. 11. ln. 9. 
On May 1 2010, the state filed a motion to reconsider. CR 42. The motion represented 
the following facts: 
By way of background, this case was set for a suppression hearing on May 7, 
2010. The State's witness, Officer Sean Stace, failed to appear at the hearing. 
The State was unable to explain the officer's failure to appear at the time. This 
Court denied the State's motion to continue and, instead, granted the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss. The State has subsequently discovered that Officer Stace was 
teaching at the POST Academy on May 7. Officer Stace mistakenly believed that 
he had notified the State that he was unavailable for the May 7 suppression 
hearing. His failure to appear was not a willful disregard of his subpoena. For 
this reason, and because the Defendant had previously been granted a continuance 
of the suppression hearing when the State was prepared to go forward, the State 
respectfully requests that the order dismissing this case be set aside and that a new 
suppression hearing be set. 
CR 42-43. This motion was not suppo11ed by an affidavit of counsel or of the missing officer, or 
by any admissible evidence. 
On May 13, 2010, Mr. Small filed an objection to the motion to reconsider. CR 45-48. 
In the objection, Mr. Small argued that he had not previously sought a continuance of the motion 
to suppress noting that, although the 4:00 a.m. hearing time was an obvious clerical error, Mr. 
Small appeared at 4:00 p.m., but did not see his name on the docket sheet as the hearing was not 
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calendared for March 9,2010 at 4:00 p.m. Thus. the suppression hearing was actually 
rescheduled in order to correct the en-or in the notice of hearing. He argued, --The Defendant did 
not request said Continuance, nor was the rescheduling of this hearing done at the motion of 
Defendant. For the State to use the argument that they should receive a continuance of the 
hearing of the motion to suppress due to the fact that Defendant previously requested and was 
granted a continuance of said hearing, is disingenuous and without merit." CR 46-47. 
The objection also argued that the officer's disobedience to the subpoena was not good 
cause to grant the motion to reconsider. Id. Finally, Mr. Small noted that granting the state's 
motion would unfairly "cause him to devote more time, energy and resources towards [sic] this 
case, and would pose a substantial economic hardship for him as preparing for and dealing with 
the case would interfere with his ability to work and earn a living." CR 48. 
The magistrate court granted the state's motion without holding a hearing or otherwise 
taking evidence. Notwithstanding that, the court made the following findings of fact: 
1. Defendant was arrested and charged by citation with the offense of Driving 
Without Privileges (3rd Offence) on November 22, 2009; 
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was originally set incorrectly for March 9, 
2010, at 4:00 AM. Counsel for Defendant appeared at 4:00 PM that day and 
requested a set over which was granted without objection; 
3. Defendant appeared in court for the Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2010. The 
state's witness, Officer Sean Stace, was subpoenaed but did not appear. The state 
was unable to reach Officer Stace or provide any reason for his absence and 
moved for a continuance; 
4. Defendant objected and moved for dismissal; 
5. I dismissed the case. Within an hour of the dismissal I sent the 
following e-mail to the parties: 
Ms. Udink and Mr. Marcus, 
Upon leaving the bench today I realized that dismissal of this case was 
technically improper without proper notice under rule 48. With that in 
mind, the City is free to file a motion to reconsider the dismissal. If the 
City would like me to reconsider the denial of the continuance, it will have 
to show good cause for the officer's absence. 
My apologies to you both, 
Dan Steckel 
6. On May 12, 2010, the State filed its Motion to Reconsider. On May 13, 2010, 
Defendant filed his Objection to Motion to Reconsider; The court finds that there 
is good cause for the state's request. 
The state's Motion to Reconsider is granted. 
CR 49-50. 1 
Later, Mr. Small's attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. CR 63. The court 
held a hearing on the motion and granted it. In addition, the motion to suppress was vacated and 
the case set for a pre-trial conference and a jury trial. CR 68. There is no indication in the record 
that Mr. Small was served with notice of the hearing on the motion to withdraw. CR 4 (Register 
of Actions). He was not present at this hearing on the motion; thus, he did not get oral notice of 
the comi's ruling on the motion, the vacation of the motion to suppress or the scheduling orders. 
CR 68. Further, there is no indication in the record that Mr. Small was sent a copy of the court's 
order permitting his attorney to withdrawal, although the notice of the pretrial conference was 
1 The court's failure to hold a hearing and require the state to put on evidence appears to 
violate the rule in State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009), that an 
evidentiary showing is required when a motion is predicated on alleged facts that do not appear 
in the record and which the opposing party has not conceded. "When the stated grounds for a 
motion ... require a presentation of evidence, the Idaho Rules of Evidence apply." Id The state 
was never required to put on any evidence to establish its asserted good cause for the officer's absence. 
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mailed to Mr. Small at an Idaho address, which is different from the Boise address which 
appears on the citation. Compare CR 7 (Boise address); 70 (Eagle address). 
Mr. Small did not appear for his pretrial conference. However, unlike the police officer 
who failed to appear, the court did not give Mr. Small a chance to explain his absence before 
sanctions were imposed. [nstead, the court ordered that the $500 bond be forfeited and issued a 
bench warrant with a bond amount of $2500. CR 71-72. (Mr. Small later told the court that he 
did not receive notice of the pretrial hearing because he was working out-of-state. T p. 26, In. 24 
- p. 27, In. 5.) 
Attorney Alexander Briggs entered a notice of appearance on October 19, and moved to 
quash the bench warrant. CR 73. Mr. Small argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to 
issue the bench warrant because it did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion to reconsider 
because it dismissed the misdemeanor charge on May 7. CR 73-74. Mr. Small posted the 
increased bond prior to the hearing on the motion to quash. CR 76-77. 
On November 29, 2010, Mr. Small moved to dismiss the case arguing that Rule 48(c) 
does not permit the subsequent prosecution of a misdemeanor case which was dismissed under 
Rule 48(a). T p. 12, ln. 4-16. He further argued that once the case was dismissed, the court lost 
jurisdiction to entertain the motion to reconsider and that the only mechanism for relief available 
to the state was a timely notice of appeal. T p. 15, In. 1 - p. 16, In. 17. The court denied the 
motion stating that it believed the original order dismissing the case was made in error and that 
Rule 48(c) does not prevent the court from reconsidering an order. T p. 18, In. 6-13; p. 19, In. 22 
- p. 20, In. 7. 
Mr. Small then asked the court for permission to take an interlocutory appeal of the 
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court's order denying the motion to dismiss. T p. 20, In. 16-22. The state opposed the motion 
for permission to take an interlocutory appeal. The couri agreed that the matter should be set for 
trial but that Mr. Small would "certainly free to appeal" after the trial and further said that "if it 
doesn't work out for you, Mr. Small, then I'm happy to stay the sentence pending an appeal; 
okay?" T p. 22, In. 22 - p. 23, In. 3. 
The motion to suppress was never reset for a hearing, but on February 16, 2011, Mr. 
Small entered into a Written Guilty Plea to an amended charge of DWP (first offense). See CR 
3 7 (second amended complaint with handwritten notation of amendment made by Judge 
Steckel); 91 (written guilty plea). The plea was apparently accepted in chambers by Judge 
Theresa Gardunia on behalf of Judge Steckel and no record of the proceedings exists. See CR 92 
(no tape designation in upper right hand comer). The written guilty plea form noted that the 
sentence was "All stayed pending appeal - Notice filed this week." This notation is consistent 
with the comments made by the court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, i.e., that Mr. Small 
was free to appeal the unfavorable ruling on his motion to dismiss and that the court would stay 
the imposition of sentence pending the appeal. At the same time, a preprinted box on the guilty 
plea form noted that Mr. Small was waiving his right "[t]o appeal the conviction, although the 
sentence may be appealed." CR 91. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. CR 94. 
While the written guilty plea appears to only preserve Mr. Small's right to appeal from 
the sentence imposed, Mr. Small's Appellant's Brief noted that the appeal was "brought after a 
conditional plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of Driving While Suspended." CR 106. 
Mr. Small went on to raise the issue and brief the issue of" [ w ]hether the Magistrate Court Lost 
Jurisdiction After the Charge Was Dismissed on May 7, 2010." CR 109. Mr. Small did not 
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challenge the sentence imposed. It must have been the understanding of the parties that Mr. 
Small's written guilty plea permitted him to raise the jurisdictional issue on appeal because the 
state· s recitation of facts in its Respondent's Brief concludes that "Small then entered a 
conditional plea and filed this appeal." CR 130. This shows there was an agreement between the 
parties to allow Mr. Small to appeal more than the sentence as no conditional plea is required to 
appeal a sentence. See I.C.R. 11 (a)(2). In addition, the state did not move to dismiss the appeal 
or ever assert that Mr. Small was barred from raising his jurisdictional challenge and went on to 
address the question on the merits in its brief. CR 130-139. 
Likewise, the district court acknowledged that "Small, pursuant to a conditional guilty 
plea, was convicted of the charge. lmposition of sentence was stayed pending this appeal." CR 
146. The district court rejected Mr. Small's jurisdictional argument and affirmed the 
magistrate's decision to reconsider his dismissal of the case. CR 150. 
The district court rejected Mr. Small's jurisdictional argument relying upon State v. 
Swartz, 109 Idaho 1033, 1035, 712 P.2d 734, 736 (Ct. App. 1985), where the Court of Appeals 
reversed the granting of a Rule 48( a) motion to dismiss due to lack of advance notice to the state. 
CR 147. 
The district court also relied on Swartz for the proposition that a dismissal under Rule 
48(a) is not a bar to further prosecution of the charge unless the dismissal is "valid and final" and 
found that "[h]ere, the magistrate's dismissal was neither final nor valid." CR 148. 
A timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's order \Vas filed on May 18, 2012. CR 
154. 
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May Mr. Small raise his challenge to the order granting the motion to reconsider and 
the order denying his later motion to dismiss on appeal in the absence of a written reservation of 
that right in the Written Plea Agreement? 
2. Did the Court have the jurisdiction to reconsider its order dismissing the case under 
I.C.R. 48? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, the 
appellate court will review the decision of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 
Idaho 670,672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). It will examine the magistrate record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Id. A magistrate 
court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence or if the 
magistrate does not correctly apply the law. Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 93,253 P.3d 764, 
767 (Ct. App. 2011), citing Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561-62, 633P.2d1137, 1139-40 
(1981 ). This Court freely reviews a lower court's conclusions oflaw. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 7 
Idaho 912,916,216 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2009), citing Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 885, 173 
P .3d 1141, 1 144 (2007). 
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B. This Court Jf ay Consider the Challenge on Appeal 
1. The state is estopped from arguing Mr. Small does not have the 
right lo appeal 
Due to the absence of a written reservation of appellate rights, the state may argue that 
there is not an adequate conditional plea of guilty under I.C.R. 11 (a)(2) and that his challenge on 
appeal was waived in the magistrate court. However, the state is judicially estopped from taking 
a position directly opposite the position it conceded in the appeal to the district court. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one 
position, and then seeking a second advantage by an incompatible position. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004). The Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). As explained by the 
Court of Appeals, there are very important reasons behind the doctrine of judicial estoppel: 
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by 
protecting the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity 
of judicial proceedings. The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from 
playing fast and loose with the courts. 
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, l O 1, P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted) cited with.favor in A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 14 l Idaho at 685, 
116 P.3d at 15. 
Here, the state obtained a guilty plea from Mr. Small conditioned on its concession that 
he could appeal from the order made upon reconsideration and form the one denying his motion 
to dismiss. The state conceded that the guilty plea was conditioned upon this promise in its brief 
to the district court. Thus, it is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel if it argues to the 
contrary now. 
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2. Jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal 
llere, Mr. Small argues that the magistrate court did not have either the jurisdiction or the 
authority to reconsider its order dismissing the case. As explained below, absent specific 
authorization otherwise, the trial court's jurisdiction terminates once a final order is entered. A 
claim that the court did not have jurisdiction to act can be raised at any time, including for the 
first time on appeal. See I.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294,300, I P.3d 795, 
80 I (2000); State v. Cahoon, 1 I 6 Idaho 399, 400, 775 P.2d I 241, 1242 (I 989). This is true even 
in cases where the defendant has entered a guilty plea. See State v. Nfanzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 
272 P.3d 382,392 (2012) ("Ordinarily, a plea of guilty, if voluntarily and knowingly made, is 
conclusive as to the defendant's guilt and waives all non-jurisdictional defects in prior 
proceedings against the defendant.") (emphasis added). Thus, even if the state were not estopped 
from asserting there was not an adequate conditional plea of guilty, Mr. Small does not need a 
written reservation of his right to appeal. He never waived his jurisdictional challenge. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Have the Power to Reconsider its Final Order 
I. The magistrate court did not have the jurisdiction to reconsider 
its dismissal 
In this case, Mr. Small argued in the district court that the magistrate court did not have 
jurisdiction to reconsider its order of dismissal. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to 
determine cases over a general type or class of dispute." Bach v. Nfiller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 
P.3d 305,308 (2007). As shown below, once a judgment is entered, whether of acquittal, 
dismissal or conviction, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction to modify that judgment, 
except to the extent it is specifically granted by statute or rule. Here, the magistrate comi had no 
IO 
inherent, statutory or rule-based authority to reconsider its final order dismissing the ease and 
thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to do so. 
In State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004), the Supreme Court stated that 
once subject matter jurisdiction is acquired, it continues until some event ends the power. 140 
Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132. Further, the Supreme Court held in State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 
352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003), that a trial court loses subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea when the judgment of conviction has become final noting that "a 
eourt'sjurisdietion to amend or set aside the judgment in a ease does not continue forever." 139 
Idaho at 354, 79 P.3d at 713, 789 citing, inter alia, Boyd v. Steele, 6 Idaho 625, 59 P. 21 (1899) 
(where action had been dismissed by plaintiff, district court lost jurisdiction over the matter). 
"Thus, in certain circumstances, our Supreme Court has indicated that subject matter jurisdiction, 
although initially obtained, may cease. It is not entirely dear, however, as to the precise 
circumstances in which a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction ceases, thereby terminating its 
power to act, as opposed to those circumstances which define the boundaries of the trial court's 
authority to act within its subject matter jurisdiction." State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 761-62, 
241 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2010). 
In this ease, the motion to reconsider was filed after the order of dismissal was filed, but 
before the 42 days in which to file an appeal had elapsed. However, since there is no rule based 
or statutory authority for a motion to reconsider a dismissal in a criminal ease, the court lost 
jurisdiction when it issued a final order dismissing the ease. Consequently, the only remedy 
available to the state was to appeal the order. Compare State v. Nelson, l 04 Idaho 430, 659 P.2d 
783 (Ct. App. 1983) (interlocutory order granting the defendant's motion to suppress may be 
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reconsidered); see also State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 320, 756 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Ct. App. 
1988) (same). Those cases differ from the present one because they involve reconsideration of 
interlocutory orders. The order of dismissal is a final order. Just as the state may not move to 
reconsider the length of a sentence after the filing of a judgment of conviction, it may not move 
for the reconsideration of an order dismissing the case. It may only file a notice of appeal. See 
State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 120, 29 P.3d 949, 956 (2001), where the Court held that the 
district court had the authority to reconsider a motion in limine made prior to trial because "[a]n 
order granting a motion in limine is not a final order." By contrast, a written order dismissing a 
case is a final order and the magistrate court had no jurisdiction to reconsider it. 
2. The district court erred in affirming the order granting the 
motion to reconsider and the order denying the second motion to 
dismiss 
The district court's reliance upon State v. Swartz, 109 Idaho 1033, 1035, 712 P.2d 734, 
736 (Ct. App. 1985), is misplaced. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that"[ n Jo notice was 
given to the prosecutor that the cases would be dismissed by the court on its own volition for 
failure of the prosecutor to appear and resist the motions of the defendants. We believe the 
prosecutor was entitled to such advance notice under rule 48, affording him an opportunity to 
explain to the magistrate his reasons for not appearing." From this, the district court concluded 
that in Mr. Small's case the magistrate court had jurisdiction to grant the motion to reconsider on 
that same basis, i.e., the lack of notice to the state. However, the state in Swartz did not file a 
motion to reconsider, it filed a notice of appeal and thus the Court of Appeals was vested with 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Swartz does not stand for the proposition that a court 
may reconsider a Rule 48(a) dismissal. 
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Further, the district court misconstrued the language from Swartz that "in order for such a 
dismissal to be a bar to further prosecutions, the dismissal must be valid and final." Swartz, 
supra. The district court took this to mean that the magistrate may change its final order 
dismissing the case if the time to appeal has not expired or if there are technical pro bl ems with 
the order itself, such as the failure to comply with the fonnal requirements of I.C.R. 48(b ). 
However, Swartz, does not address that issue because those facts were not before it. In Swartz, 
the Court of Appeals could remand for a trial because it had jurisdiction as a timely notice of 
appeal had been filed and it could reverse the order because it was not valid. But Swartz has 
nothing to say about the situation here. Thus, while the magistrate judge's written order of 
dismissal on the face of the Second Amended Complaint may not have complied with the rules, 
noncompliance with the rules does not give the magistrate court jurisdiction to reinstate the case 
after dismissal.2 See State v. Young, supra. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The magistrate court erred by reconsidering the final order of dismissal and by denying 
Mr. Small's later motion to dismiss. The district court erred in holding otherwise. For the 
reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate the order reconsidering the order of dismissal, 
reverse the order denying the motion to dismiss and dismiss the case. 
2 Theorderreads: "5/7/l0Dismiss'dDLS[.]" CR37. Whilethatorderwasarguably 
inadequate under Rule 4 8(b ), it was a judgment from which an appeal could be taken. I. C.R. 
33(b) ("If the defendant ... is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be entered accordingly. 
The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk") and l.A.R. 11 ( c )(3) (An 
appeal may be taken from "[ a ]n order dismissing a motion to dismiss an information or 
complaint."). See also Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 804, 573 P.2d 116, 123 (1977) ("While 
the district court may have erred ... in failing to set out the reasons for dismissal in the minutes, 
it does not follow that the order is thus void."). 
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Respectfully submitted of October, 2012. 
~v-'5.t?-'=9c-----
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Ryan Small 
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